Total System Failure — the British Post Office IT Scandal Is Not Over Yet

Author
Wolfgang Hauptfleisch
Published
08 Jul 2025
Abstract
26 years after the first sub-postmaster was convicted of allegedly defrauding the Post Office, a new report released today has revealed the enormous human suffering this scandal has caused.

26 years after the first sub-postmaster was convicted of allegedly defrauding the Post Office, a new report released today¹ has revealed the enormous human suffering this scandal has caused. All because no one wanted to admit a software could be wrong.

A long time ago and yet..

What is now known as the British Post Office scandal or the Horizon IT scandal has been longer in the news repeatedly for the last years:Between 1999 and 2015, more than 900 sub-postmasters (a self-employed operator running a Post Office branch as the Post Office’s agent) in the United Kingdom were convicted of theft, fraud and false accounting based on what later turned out was a faulty accounting software.

It took almost 15 years before the courts started to doubt what the Post Office claimed had happened, and another 10 years before a new report outlined the scale of damage this scandal has done.

Horizon was an electronic point-of-sale system developed by multinational IT company Fujitsu and introduced originally in 1999. Again, strangely, no one appeared to have connected the rise in “fraud cases” with the introduction of the new system. Over the next 16 years, failures in the system the Post Office claimed to work perfectly fine led to 900 convictions, because people trusted the software and, for various reasons, did not look too closely at the details. That no one raised alarms about the sheer number of similar cases is stunning.

Ignorance as the best defence

In reality the system was not working as expected, it was full of bugs, some of them later named after the locations of the post offices where they were recorded:

To pick on bug specifically, named the “Dalmellington Bug” after a village in East Ayrshire, Scotland, the location of the post office where it was first observed: This bug would cause the screen to freeze when a user attempted to confirm the receipt of cash, and silently record another transaction each time the user pressed “Enter”. As a result, the Post Office then tried to hold the sub-postmaster accountable for the obvious discrepancy in the records and the missing money.²

Such a blatant disregard for transaction safety surely makes a system of such importance appropriate for the task. A relatively simple system audit, red teaming or a stress test should have revealed that quickly.

Not fit for purpose

It should not have taken until 2015 to come to this conclusion: In a 2003 case³, Jason Coyne, an IT expert, was asked to examine the Horizon system and submit a report as a neutral expert witness. His conclusion was that there were “fundamental problems within the accounting system”. Coyne stated later that the Post Office lawyers were “disappointed” by his report, decided to settle the case out of court, leading to his report never being published.⁴

When Detica, a British IT security and information intelligence company, finally undertook a detailed analysis of the Post Office’s accounting system in 2013, auditors came to the conclusion that the systems were “not fit for purpose”.⁵

One year later system auditors from consultant firm Deloitte found that branch accounts could be altered remotely by Fujitsu — a fact that had been denied by Fujitsu before. When Deloitte then, two years later, wanted to begin to look into Horizon transactions since its launch in 1999, the Post Office halted their work because of “pending legal class action”.⁶

It took until 2018 that the Horizon system was declared “unreliable” in court (in Bates & Others v Post Office Ltd, a court case turned into a TV drama⁷ that brought the cases to a wider attention).

But by this time so much damage had been done.⁸

Political action

In early 2024 the UK government finally introduced legislation to exonerate wrongly convicted Post Office branch managers and offering a payment of £75,000. At the same time new legislation would aim to ensure that any sub-postmaster guilty of criminal wrongdoing was still subject to prosecution, a rather strange move considering what was already known at the time.

Maybe there were really some who committed fraud, we will likely never know. But it can not serve as a justification to delay or make the process even harder for the vast majority of post office managers affected, and it seems to contradict the Blackstone ratio that “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” By February 2024, only 100 of the convictions had been overturned, with up to 10,000 people waiting for compensation.

Human cost, and any lessons?

Even those who were acquitted at the time often found themselves socially isolated. Due to the process spanning more than 25 years now, many of those accused or convicted have died before receiving any compensation — some have put the figure at about 350.⁹

The newly released report goes into the human cost of the scandal that reached way beyond legal repercussions. In part 3 (titled “THE HUMAN IMPACT”) the report states that “there is a causal connection between the deaths of [..] 13 persons and Horizon [..] I do not rule it out as a real possibility”.

The report further states that the inquiry found “evidence from at least 59 persons who contemplated suicide at various points in time and who attributed this to their experiences with Horizon and/or the Post Office.” and “from 19 persons who said they abused alcohol”. [2025 Report, Volume 1, 3.11–3.12]

It continues: “I have little doubt that many accused persons were advised by their lawyers to plead guilty to the offence of false accounting when charged with that offence.” [2025 Report, Volume 1, 3.16]

So much went wrong over such a long time, with so many people involved that it is hard to pick a specific point of failure, but one thing is for sure, there need to be lessons from this for the future.

In 2024, in a policy paper, the Institute of Directors published paper called the scandal a “failure of governance”¹⁰ and presents a list of actions to improve governance and oversight.

The British Computer Society has called for reconsideration of the courts’ default presumption that computer data is correct, writing that “The legal assumption that computer evidence is always right was one of the many reasons why over 700 sub-postmasters were wrongly prosecuted [..] A presumption that a computer is ‘working properly’ is wholly unrealistic for anyone with computer science or software engineering expertise. [..] The assumption also assumes that the answer is trivially easy to give.” ¹¹

Future issues

It came so far because the people responsible for the accounting software — most who had no idea of the technical details— maintained it could not possibly be wrong and moved the burden of proof on the accused, a strategy that worked for 16 years.

If that is not scary enough, what happen in the future when such failures will be blamed on some obscure AI models with unclear responsibility and liability. The post office scandal did not even touch issues of automated decision-making system nor would it likely fall into a high risk category by default.

How will this play out when more systems are moved into the cloud and are permanently updated with possibly no path to find faults a decade later The scandal could just serve as a cautionary tale in IT development if it was not for the immense damage it has to human lives. It is so much more: A failure of IT development, the judicial system and politics all at once, all either missing the wider picture or ignoring it deliberately. A total system failure.

While the European Union finally started to tackle questions of liability and burden of proof for service based IT systems, the UK government has not developed such concepts and appears reluctant to tackle the upcoming issues with AI, possibly laying the ground for new scandals to come.

The lesson to be learned should be that responsibility and transparency needs to start from the ground up, in the companies that develop those systems, including developers and team leaders. This must include strong encouragement and protection for whistleblowers through the whole chain of command. It needs to continue with the companies that deploy them and third party auditors that do not shy away when they identify issues.

Compensation for those affected comes very late, for some too late. But the effort to avoid something like this happening again needs to start now.



¹ Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry — Report Volume 1, 8 July 2025

² Bates v Post Office — PDF

³ How the Post Office’s Horizon system failed: a technical breakdown — The Guardian, 2024

⁴ Sub-postmasters used as ‘guinea pigs’ to grind out issues in Horizon, says expert who warned of problems in 2003 — Sky News, 2024

⁵ The Swift Review, 2022 [PDF]

⁶ Cameron government knew Post Office ditched Horizon IT investigation — BBC, 2024

⁷ Mr Bates v The Post Office: A valuable take on an unbelievable scandal — John Hyde, The Law Society Gazette, 2024

⁸ “Systemically, seriously wrong”: the 20-year quest to reveal Post Office IT scandal — The Guardian, 2024

⁹ Post Office Horizon IT scandal: five things we learned from the report — The Guardian, 2025

¹⁰ The Post Office Scandal A failure of governance — Institute of Directors, 2024

¹¹ Post Office scandal: understanding computer evidence in cases — BCS, 2024